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An Analysis of the United States
Employment Immigration System in
Attracting and Retaining Skilled Workers
and the Effects of Its Dichotomous
Objectives—Competitiveness versus
Protectionism: A Case for Reform?
Vignaswari Saminathan*
“[F]rom this day forth, those wishing to emigrate into America shall be
admitted on the basis of their skills.”1
—Lyndon Johnson
I.

Introduction

The statement made by President Lyndon Johnson upon signing the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) describes today’s
* The Author holds LL.B (University of Sheffield, U.K.), LL.M in International
Business Law (University College London, U.K.), LL.M in International Law (University
of Houston, Texas, U.S.) and MBA (Oklahoma City University, U.S.) as well as being
admitted as a Barrister-at-Law to the Utter Bar of the Honorable Society of Middle
Temple (U.K.) and an Advocate & Solicitor of the Malayan High Court. The Author’s
practice areas had included corporate banking, finance, and capital markets, and currently
her focus is on multilateral and regional efforts pertaining to financial and trade
arrangements, with a special interest on the impact of immigration on regional and global
level. She would like to take this opportunity to extend her heartfelt gratitude to Lisa
Tilton-McCarty, Professor of Legal Research and Writing at University of Houston Law
Center as well as the dedicated Pace Law Review team for their outstanding efforts in
editing and making possible the publication of this Article.
1. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 162 (5th ed. 2003); Ayelet Shachar, The Race For Talent: Highly
Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 170
(2006).
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immigration system for the admission of immigrants of skill. Nowadays
these immigrants are identified as the “best and brightest.”2 The best and
brightest receive preferential treatment because of the significant
contributions these immigrants make to the U.S. economy.3
Other governments of the world share the goal of attracting and
retaining the best and brightest:
Governments throughout the world recognize that a
high-skill [Science & Engineering] workforce is
essential for economic strength. Countries beyond the
United States have been taking action to increase the
capacity of their higher education systems, attract
foreign students and workers, and raise the attractiveness
to their own citizenry of staying home or returning from
abroad to serve growing national economics and
research enterprises.4
As a result, immigration has taken on a new dimension because
highly skilled immigrants now have many choices about where to
immigrate.5 Given this development, can the U.S. immigration system
maintain its competitiveness?
Over the years, two divergent objectives have emerged within the
U.S. system: protectionist measures to safeguard or protect the interests
of U.S. workers, and competitive measures to attract and retain the best
and brightest immigrants. When in balance, these dichotomous
objectives should promote adequate protection of U.S. workers and the
global competitiveness necessary to attract talented immigrants to
enhance the U.S. economy. However, the high demand for skilled
international workers by domestic U.S. industries during the economic
boom of the 1990s (as well as the period of 2004-2007) stretched the

2. Shachar, supra note 1.
3. See Ajay Malshe, From Obsolete to Essential: How Reforming Our Immigration
Laws Can Stimulate and Strengthen the United States Economy, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV.
358 (2010); see also Courtney L. Cromwell, Note, Friend or Foe of the U.S. Labor
Market: Why Congress Should Raise or Eliminate the H-1B Visa Cap., 3 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 455 (2009).
4. Shachar, supra note 1, at 195 (quoting NAT’L SCI. BD., THE SCIENCE AND
ENGINEERING WORKFORCE: REALIZING AMERICA’S POTENTIAL 11 (2003), available
athttp://www.nsf.gov/nsb/documents/2003/nsb0369/nsb0369.pdf).
5. Shachar, supra note 1, at 152.
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capacity of the immigration system because of quantitative constraints
imposed on immigration to protect the interests of U.S. workers.6 As a
result, instead of being able to offer the best and brightest immediate
legal permanent residency, as is being done within competitor nations,
the U.S. can now, at best, only offer a long wait for legal permanent
residency, and at the worst, offer an uncertain future as to whether the
application for permanent residency will be decided in favor of the
would-be immigrant.7 Thus, instead of being admitted on the basis of
skill, as envisaged by President Johnson, the best and brightest, for most
of their productive years, are admitted into the U.S. on a temporary
nonimmigrant visa.8
The aim of this Article is to analyze the dichotomous objectives of
U.S. immigration policy and to determine what recourse exists to
improve the competitiveness of the U.S. immigration system and to
ensure adequate protection for U.S. workers. Given that the H-1B visa,
the temporary nonimmigrant visa category, has become a very important
stepping stone to legal permanent residency, this Article will examine the
developments and impact of the dichotomous measures within the
context of the H-1B as well as the second employment-based preference
category (EB-2) and the third employment-based preference category
(EB-3).9 As such, Part II of this Article will trace the development of
measures encapsulating these dichotomous objectives. Part III will
analyze the effect quantitative restraints have had on the immigration of
the best and brightest. The Article then, in Part IV, will examine the
impact of the dichotomous objectives on four levels: the global labor
market, the needs of the U.S. domestic market; protections of U.S.
workers; and interests of the international workers. In Part V, the focus
will be on finding solutions and making recommendations that go toward
realigning these dichotomous objectives to ensure that the needs at all
four levels are met.

6. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 455-58.
7. See NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD
PROJECTIONS
POINT
TO
DECADE-LONG
WAITS
(2009),
available
at
http://www.nfap.com/pdf/091117pb.pdf [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD].
8. See Moira Herbst, One Easy Fix for Immigration, BUS. WEEK (June 21, 2007),
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jun2007/db20070620_915353.ht
m; see also Vivek Wadhwa, America’s Other Immigration Crisis, AMERICAN (July/Aug.
http://www.american.com/archive/2008/july-august-magazine2008),
contents/america2019s-other-immigration-crisis.
9. See Malshe, supra note 3; see also Cromwell, supra note 3.
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Tracing the Dichotomy in the History of U.S. Immigration Laws

This Part will examine the dichotomy between competitiveness and
protectionism throughout the history of U.S. immigration policy as it
relates to employment concerns.
A.

The Early Years

During its first one hundred years, the U.S. offered an open door
policy to immigrants.10 There were no impediments in regards to quotas
based on origin of nationality nor was there a cap on the number of aliens
admitted to the U.S. It was not until 1875 that the first immigration
restrictions began to appear.11 In 1885, the first employment-based
immigration restriction was imposed by the Alien Contract Labor Laws
(ACLL), which barred cheap foreign workers in an attempt to safeguard
domestic workers against labor market depression.12 An 1888
amendment to the ACLL required deportation of those persons entering
the country in violation of the ACLL.13 In 1921, the first quota system
was put in place, not to address immigrant employment issues, but
instead in response to fears of a mass influx of immigrants from Southern
and Eastern Europe after the First World War.14 This system established
an annual national origin quota of 3 percent for each nationality already
in the U.S.15
B.

The McCarran Walter Act of 1952 and the 1965 Amendment
The present structure of the immigration system was established by

10. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 148-51.
11. See IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 3 (12th. ed. 2011) (The
Act of March 3, 1875 required “the exclusion of convicts and prostitutes.”).
12. See FRAGOMAN ET AL., H-1B HANDBOOK §1:2 (2011 ed.). The anti-contract
labor law was incorporated into the Immigration Act of 1917. The aim of the law was to
prevent U.S. employers from employing cheap foreign labor to break strikes as well as to
safeguard against the depression of wages and working conditions in the U.S. Id.
13. KURZBAN, supra note 11. The 1888 amendment was the first statute to impose a
one-year bar on re-entry by the deported aliens. Id.
14. Id. at 4. The quota imposed by the 1921 Act, after gradual reductions, was
eventually repealed by the 1965 amendment. Id.
15. Id. The 3 percent was based on the 1910 census. Id.
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the McCarran Walter Act (INA), which was the product of a two-year
study conducted by the Senate Judiciary Committee.16 Recognizing the
value of attracting talented immigrant and nonimmigrant workers, the
Senate recommended the abolishment of the contract labor bar17 and,
more importantly, established preferences within the quotas for aliens
with special skills.18 This was the precursor to today’s first, second, and
third employment-based preferences.19 The INA also established a
temporary nonimmigrant visa category, known as H-1, for
nonimmigrants who had “distinguished merit and ability.”20 The
competitiveness of the immigration system, however, was tempered by
pressures from labor unions.21 This pressure culminated in the
establishment of a labor certification requirement in 1965, as a
mechanism to protect U.S. workers from cheap foreign labor.22
C.

Immigration Act of 1990

The impetus behind the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990
(IMMACT90) was increasing global competition for the best and
brightest immigrants, which was driven by the burgeoning hightechnology industry of the 1980s.23 The increasing competition led “to

16. Id. The McCarran Walter Act was “codified at Title 8 of the U.S. Code.” Id.
17. See FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.3 (explaining the contract labor bar).
18. KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 4.
19. FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.3
20. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 333.
22. Id. In Pesikoff v. Sec’y of Labor, 501 F.2d. 757, 761-63 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
reference was made to Senator Kennedy’s statement as to who bears the burden of proof
under the new labor certifications requirement. His statement is indicative of the intent of
the new requirement:
Under (the old) procedure, the Secretary certifies that aliens falling
under certain occupational or skill definitions should be excluded
because they will threaten domestic employment. The [1965
amendment] reverses this procedure. It places the burden of proving
no adverse effect on the applying alien. This intending immigrant
must receive a certificate from the Secretary of Labor that his
presence will not affect U.S employment, wages, or working
conditions.
Id. at 761-62.
23. See Jung S. Hahm, Note, American Competitiveness and Workforce
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fears concerning the U.S. work force’s ability to compete in the global
economy.”24 In 1967, Canada introduced a point-based system that
essentially allowed for the use of an objective tool in evaluating and
selecting foreign nationals with high levels of skill sets or abilities.25 The
point-based system proved to be successful.26 As a result, Australia, in
1973, and, subsequently, New Zealand adopted similar targeting and
selecting methodology to recruit talented foreign nationals.27
The IMMACT90 was essentially a “compromise between . . . the
[INS], labor unions, the immigration bar, and an assemblage of different
groups with varying philosophies.”28 On one hand it addressed the need
to be competitive while on the other hand it ensured that U.S. workers
were protected.29 In doing so, it also substantially expanded the
employment-based immigration system.30 In the process, it created the
five employment-based preferences31 for permanent immigration and
restructured the nonimmigrant H-1 category.32 One of the offshoots of
that restructuring was the H-1B visa.33
Of the five employment-based preference categories,34 the two that

Improvement Act of 1998: Balancing Economic and Labor Interests Under the New H-1B
Visa Program, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1673 (2000).
24. Shachar, supra note 1, at 183 (quoting DAVID WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE 34 (3d ed. 1992)).
25. Id. at 171.
26. Id. at 176.
27. Id. at 176-83.
28. Hahm, supra note 23, at 1682 (alteration in original) (quoting Steven J.
Klearman, Nonimmigrant Business Visas After the Immigration Act of 1990, 28 GONZ. L.
REV. 53-54 (1992)); see also Klearman, supra, at 54.
29. Hahm, supra note 23, at 1679-82.
30. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 167.
31. The preference system was chosen over the point-based system by the Senate
Committee. The Preference System: Hearing on S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Refugee Policy of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 19-20
(1981) (statement of Sen. Alan K. Simpson) [hereinafter The Preference System].
32. See KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 6; see also FRAGOMAN ET AL., supra note 12.
The H-1 category is for nonimmigrants who are of “distinguished merit and ability.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
33. See FRAGOMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 1:8. The IMMACT90 excludes from the
H-1B category alien entertainers, artist, and athletes, who now must obtain a
nonimmigrant visa only through the O and P nonimmigrant categories. Id.
34. See MARTIN J. LAWLER, PROFESSIONALS: A MATTER OF DEGREE 4 (5th ed. 2009).
The first employment-based preference relates to priority workers who may be
individuals of “extraordinary ability,” outstanding “professors and researchers,” or
“executives and managers of international organizations.” Id. The second preference
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are relevant to this Article are the second preference (EB-2) category for
professional immigrants with advanced degrees and the third preference
(EB-3) for those immigrants who are professionals and skilled workers.35
Professionals must have at least a bachelor’s degree and “skilled workers
must have at least two years of training and fill a position that is
permanent.”36
Having decided on the preference issue, Congress created an annual
worldwide cap of 140,000 for the preference categories.37 This number
was further constrained by the limitation that a single country could not
exceed more than 7 percent38 of the total immigration visas available in a
particular fiscal year, amounting to 9,800 of the 140,000 annually
available visas.39
To ensure that U.S. workers would not be displaced by immigrants
in the U.S. labor market, IMMACT90 requires employers to test the
market through a comprehensive labor certification process, such as
advertisement and recruitment policies that ensure that “there are not
sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified . . . and available,” in
addition to the requirement that wages and working conditions of U.S.
workers employed in similar position will not be adversely affected.40
In order to stay competitive in the global race to attract the best and
brightest as well as to meet the demands of the labor shortage in the U.S.,
the nonimmigrant H-1B category opened only for foreign nationals
working in “specialty occupations” which require specific professional
training or a showing by the applicant of prominence in their field.41

relates to persons with advanced degrees and exceptional ability, whose work is in the
national interest to retain through permanent residence. Id. The third preference includes
skilled workers, professionals, and other workers, while the fourth preference relates to
religious workers, and the fifth preference relates to investment in new businesses that
generate U.S. jobs. Id.
35. See Janice D Villiers, Closing the Borders: Reverse Brain Drain and the Need
for Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1877, 1887 (2009).
36. Id. at 1888.
37. LAWLER, supra note 34.
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(d) (2009).
39. Id. § 1152(a).
40. Enid Trucios-Haynes, Temporary Workers and Future Immigration Policy
Conflicts: Protecting U.S. Workers and Satisfying the Demand for Global Human
Capital, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 967, 968 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(i) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Malshe, supra note 3, at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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IMMACT90 established dual intent for the H-1B visa42 and also allowed
for an extension of the time period for temporary residents who had a
pending application for permanent residency.43
Nevertheless, two important restrictions were imposed on the H-1B
visa: an annual cap of 65,00044 and a labor condition application
(LCA).45 The purpose of enacting the LCA was to protect the U.S.
workers from “wage suppression and substandard working conditions
due to competition from imported foreign labor.”46 As a result,
employers are required to attest that the H-1B hire will be paid the
prevailing wage or actual wage and that the working condition for that
hire is on par with a similar U.S. worker.47 By imposing these
requirements, the LCA ensures that the H-1B worker will also be
protected. However, the LCA is not required for those H-1B hires with
master’s degree, or those who are earning in excess of $60,000.48 This is
in line with the traditional use of the H-1 category for attracting the best
and brightest.49
D. The American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of
1998; Congressional Amendment of the H-1B Visa Program
The American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of
1998 (ACWIA) was the result of a lobbying effort by the high-tech
industry to increase the H-1B annual cap to address the shortage of

42. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 459-60. Dual intent “allows workers in the
United States on nonimmigrant visas, such as the H-1B, to apply for permanent resident
status while in the United States.” Id. at 479 (Norma Matloff, On the Need for Reform of
the H-1B Non-Immigrant Work Visa in Computer-Related Occupations, 36 U. MICH. L.J.
REFORM 815, 815 (2003)).
43. KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 7.
44. “[A] number that apparently was ‘randomly chosen without regard to American
businesses’ need for or actual use of these visas.’” Hahm, supra note 23, at 1679 (quoting
Gabrielle M. Buckley, Immigration and Nationality, 32 INT’L LAW. 471, 484 (1998)).
45. FRAGOMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 2:1; id. “The requirement was extensively
amended by the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Nationality Amendments
of 1991 (MTINA) and most recently in 1998 by the American Competitiveness and
Workforce Improvement Act (ACWIA).” FRAGOMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 2:1
46. Malshe, supra note 3, at 364.
47. See FRAGOMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 2:1.
48. See id. § 1:10.
49. See id.
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skilled workers in an industry that was booming.50 As with IMMACT90,
a compromise was reached with the various interest groups and the
annual cap was raised to 115,000 in 1999 and 2000, then lowered to
107,500 in 2001.51 The annual cap then reverted to 65,000 in 2002.52 As
to the other side of the equation, ACWIA required stricter labor
protections for U.S. workers as well as the H-1B workers employed by
H-1B dependent employers,53 and these protections were to subsist until
2002.54 An added requirement was that the H-1B worker was eligible for
the same benefits offered to a U.S. worker.55
Recognizing the need to address the labor shortage in the long run,
the ACWIA increased the fees to be paid by employers hiring H-1B
workers by $500.56 It was estimated that $75 million could be raised to
fund scholarship for low-income students in math, science, engineering,
and computer science, as well as training for thousands of Americans via
the Job Training Partnership Act.57

50. See Hahm, supra note 23, at 1674-75.
51. See id. at 1676.
52. Id.
53. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 460-61. H1-B dependent employers, created by
the ACWIA, are those employers that hire workforces that have at least 15 percent H-1B
workers. Id. at 460.
54. See Hahm, supra note 23, at 1687.
[A]n H-1B dependent employer must attest that (1) “it has not
displaced and will not displace a U.S. worker for period of 180 days,
beginning 90 days before the filing of the H-1B petition and ending
90 days after the filing of the H-1B petition;” (2) that “it will not
place the H-1B worker with another employer . . . where there are
‘indicia of an employment relationship’ between the H-1B worker
and the second employer unless it first asks the other employer
whether it has or intends to displace a U.S. worker within 180-day
period; . . . .”
Id. (quoting J. Traci Hong & David Swaim, Jr., Act Doesn’t Live up to Its Name, TEXAS
LAWYER, Jan. 18, 1999, at 26).
55. Id. at 1687-88.
56. See id. at 1686.
57. Trucios-Haynes, supra note 40, at 1009.
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E. American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of
200058
The American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of
2000 (AC21CA) took off where ACWIA left off with regards to the
demand for increased availability of skilled workers. As a result, the H1B annual cap was increased to 195,000 for the fiscal years 2001 to
2003.59 To optimize the visa allocation, visas issued by fraud or
misrepresentation were to be recaptured and restored to the cap,60 and
further, individual visa holders were to be counted only once against the
cap within the six year period, unless they were eligible for a new six
year period if they had been out of the country for one year.61 AC21CA
completely exempted from the annual cap those H-1B visas issued to
employees of higher education institutions, related nonprofit entities, and
nonprofit or governmental research organizations.62 Further exemptions
were afforded by the L-1 Visa and H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004,
which “[e]xempted up to 20,000 visas per year from the . . . cap, persons
who have earned a master’s or higher degree from a U.S. institution of
higher education.”63 And the Twenty-First Century Department of Justice
Appropriations Authorization Act allowed H-1B to extend beyond six
years where a labor certification is pending one year or more.64 The H1B petitioning fee was further increased to $1,500 by the Omnibus
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005,65 which included the H-1B
Visa Reform Act of 2004 to further fund the scholarship and training

58. American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-313, 114 Stat. 1251 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A)(iv)-(vi) (2008); see KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 12.
60. Id. § 1184(g)(3).
61. Id. § 1184(g)(7).
62. Id. § 1184(g)(5).
63. KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 19; see also Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 425(a), 118 Stat. 2809, 3356 (2004) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(5) (2008)).
64. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (2008)); see
KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 16.
65. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 §1184(c)(9)). Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 422(b)(2), 118 Stat. 2809, 3353
(2004) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(9)(B) (2008)).
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programs established under IMMACT90.66
Concerned with issues of backlogs, AC21CA allowed EB-1, EB-2,
and EB-3 beneficiaries who were unable to obtain a visa due to percountry limitations to obtain H-1B extensions beyond six years until their
adjustment of status application was adjudicated.67 Further, unused
employment-based visas were used for persons from oversubscribed
countries (e.g., India and China).68 A more significant improvement
made by AC21CA was to allow EB-1, EB-2, and EB-3 beneficiaries
whose adjustment of status applications had been pending 180 days or
more to change employers without affecting their applications, if the new
job was in the same or a similar occupational classification as the job for
which the petition was filed.69
F.

Employ American Workers Act70

In response to the 2008 financial crisis and the pressure from
various interest groups, the Employ American Workers Act (EAWA)
was enacted to prohibit the hiring of H-1B by any company accepting
TARP funds unless such hiring complied with the stricter attestation
requirements as imposed on an H-1B dependent employer. That
provision was in effect until February 17, 2011.71
III. From the Floor of the Congress to Reality: The Numbers Game
The quantitative limitations imposed on the H-1B visas and
employment-based preference categories have been controversial and
have contributed to the oversubscription and the backlog issues. This
Part will trace how the quantitative protectionist measures enacted by the
various amendments have interacted with the dynamism of the economy

66. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 462; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
REPORT ON H-1B PETITIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2005 (2006), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/H1B05Annual_08_7.pdf.
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c) (2008).
68. Id. § 1152(a)(5)(A); see KURZBAN, supra note 11.
69. Id. § 1154(j); see KURZBAN, supra note 11.
70. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L No. 111-5, § 1611,
123 Stat. 115, 305 (2009) (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (2006)).
71. See KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 28. “It exempts [the Immigration and
Nationality Act] § 212(n)(1)(E)(ii).” Id.
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and competition to contribute to two main problems that have serious
repercussions for the competitiveness of the immigration system.
A.

The Oversubscription Issue

As Table 1 shows, the overall total annual H-1B visas issued for the
last ten years have ranged from 355,000 to 460,000.72 This includes those
H-1B hires who were subject to the 65,000 annual cap, the 20,000 visas
designated since 2005 for those with a master’s degree or higher from a
U.S. institution, as well those who were H-1B hires by higher education
institutions, related nonprofit entities, and nonprofit or governmental
research organizations (not subject to any caps). Looking at Table 1 for
the years 2000 to 2007, the total number of H-1B visas issued annually
was escalating, with a slight dip in 2002 and 2003 to indicate the lagging
effect of the dot.com bubble burst on hiring policies in information
technology companies.73 A similar slowdown is indicated in 2008 and
2009 due to the recent financial crisis.

72. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2009
YEARBOOK
OF
IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS
63-65
(2010),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/ois_yb_2009.pdf [hereinafter
2009 YEARBOOK].
73. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/4

12

SAMINATHAN_Formatted_Finalv8

2012]

4/11/2012 7:34 PM

COMPETITIVENESS VERSUS PROTECTIONISM

161

Table 174
Temporary Workers in Specialty Occupation
(H1-B) (2000-2004)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

Year
Total*

355,605

384,191

370,490

360,498

386,821

NonExempt
Exempt

115,000

195,000

195,000

65,000

65,000

240,605

221,191

305,490

295,498

321,821

Percent
Exempt

67.7%

57.5%

82.5%

82%

83.2%

Temporary Workers in Specialty Occupation
(H1-B) Continued (2005-2009)
2005
2006**
2007**
2008**
2009**

Year
Total*

407,418

431,853

461,730

409,619

339,243

NonExempt
Exempt

65,000

85,000

85,000

85,000

85,000

342,418

346,853

376,730

324,619

254,243

Percent
Exempt

79.1%

80.3%

81.6%

79%

75%

* Includes those H-1B workers who work for
exempted organizations and thus do not come within the
cap.
**Visa cap for those years is 85,000—includes the
20,000 H-1B visas allotted to foreign nationals who are
graduates with a master’s degree or higher from a U.S.
university.75
Within the number of overall total H-1B visas issued annually, there

74. Id. See Table 2, infra note 80; Table 3, infra note 84.
75. See Paschal O. Nwokocha, American Employment-Based Immigration Program
in a Competitive Global Marketplace: Need for Reform, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 38,
45-47, 49 (2008).
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is a pattern for those H-1B visas issued that are subject to the annual cap.
The sum total effect of ACWIA and AC21CA is reflected in Table 2.76 In
1999 and 2000, the cap was increased to 115,000 and all visas were
issued.77 However, in 2001, the cap was increased to 195,000, but only
163,600 were issued.78 In 2002, the cap was at 195,000 but only 79,100
were issued, and in 2003, with a cap of 195,000, only 78,000 visas were
issued, due in part to the dot.com crisis.79
Table 280
H1-B Visa Caps and Issues
Fiscal Year
Visa Cap
Visas Issued
1999
115,000
115,000
2000
115,000
115,000
2001
195,000
163,000
2002
195,000
79,100
2003
195,000
78,000
In the subsequent years, when the annual cap reverted to the preACWIA and AC21CA level, the scramble for H-1B visas within the
exempted category comprising 85,000 visas in total can be seen by the
oversubscription as well as the cutoff subscription date that gets earlier
and earlier. For the 2006 fiscal year, it was August 10, 2005.81 For the
2007 fiscal year, it was May 26, 2006.82 Finally, for the 2009 fiscal year ,
163,000 petitions were submitted by April 10, 2008 (see Table 3).83

76. NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, H-1B VISAS BY THE NUMBERS: 2010 AND
BEYOND 5 (2010), available at http://www.nfap.com/pdf/1003h1b.pdf [hereinafter VISAS
BY THE NUMBERS].
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Nwokocha, supra note 75, at 47.
82. Id.
83. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/4

14

SAMINATHAN_Formatted_Finalv8

2012]

4/11/2012 7:34 PM

COMPETITIVENESS VERSUS PROTECTIONISM

163

Table 384
H1-B Visa Cap and Cutoff Dates
Fiscal
Visa Cap
Date Cap
Year
Reached
2005
65,000
10/1/2004**
2006
85,000*
8/10/2005**
2007
85,000*
5/26/2006**
2008
85,000*
4/3/2007
2009
85,000*
4/10/2008

Applications
Received
65,000
85,000
85,000
150,000
163,000

* Includes the 20,000 H-1B visas allotted to foreign
nationals who are graduates with a master’s degree or
higher from a U.S. university.85
** Cutoff dates when H-1B stopped receiving due
to cap being reached.86
Interestingly, the H-1B visas issued yearly from the exempted
category kept within a range of 79-83 percent of the total amount issued,
except that in 2000 and 2001 the figure was much lower due to the
increase in the issuances of H-1B visas that were subject to the increase
in the annual cap. In 2009, the number dipped to 75 percent due to the
global financial crisis (see Table 1), demonstrating the effect of free
market forces on immigrant supply and demand. On the other hand, the
H-1B visas that were subject to the cap had been oversubscribed since
2005, indicating the strong unmet demand by the economy (see Table 3).
B.

The Backlog Issue

Two conditions contribute to the backlog issue: the huge volume of
H-1B visa holders applying for legal permanent residence under the EB2 and EB-3 categories, and the 7 percent country origin limitation
imposed by the INA.
Given the large number of H-1B issuances over the years (see Table

84. Id.
85. See id. at 46.
86. Id. at 47.
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1), it was estimated that in 2006 there were over 1,000,000 H-1B visa
holders (including their dependents) who had applied for legal permanent
residence—most of them through EB-2 and EB-3 categories.87 It is likely
that this number may have doubled by now.88 Such a huge volume of
applications needs time to be processed, given that the maximum cap for
all five employment-based categories is 140,000 and EB-2 and EB-3 are
only allocated 40,040 immigrant visas each.89 The visa allocation process
is further impacted by the restrictions imposed by section 202(a) of the
INA, which requires that “[t]he total number of immigrant visas made
available to natives of a single foreign state . . . may not exceed 7 percent
. . . of the total number of such visas made available under such
subsections in that fiscal year.”90 As a result, immigrants from a
particular country of origin under EB-2 and EB-3 are technically limited
to 3,920 legal permanent resident visas. Any unused visas from the other
three preference categories will then be utilized under EB-2 and EB-3, as
the maximum annual number of immigrant visas issued per country
cannot exceed 9,800 visas,91 despite the fact that the AC21CA now
allows unused visas to be utilized to meet the demands of oversubscribed
countries, increasing the national origin quota ceiling further.92
The limited amount of immigrant visas and the country of origin
constraints have a serious effect on the waiting period for legal
87. See Steve Lohr, The Real High-Tech Immigrant Problem: They’re Leaving,
N.Y.
TIMES
BLOG
(Mar.
2,
2009,
12:01
AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/the-real-high-tech-immigrant-problem-theyreleaving; see also Wadhwa, supra note 8.
88. See EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7. For the last ten years,
even if half of the H-1B holders had applied for legal permanent residence under the EB2 and EB-3 categories, there would have been, approximately 1,954,000 principal
applications, which when taken together with their dependents, would equal around
2,150,000 applicants. Id.
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (d)(1)(A) provides that maximum number of visas available for
the five employment-based categories is 140,000. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (d)(1)(A) (2009). Visa
allocation should not exceed 28.6 percent (40,040) of that maximum number for EB-1,
EB-2 and EB-3 respectively, 8 U.S.C § 1153(b) (2006), and should not exceed 7.1
percent (9,940) for EB-1 and EB-2 respectively, 8 U.S.C § 1153(b)(4) (2006).
90. EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7, at 2 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1152(a)(2) (2000)).
91. See Malshe, supra note 3, at 388.
92. See EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7, at 2; see also KURZBAN,
supra note 11, at 12. Although the effect of AC21CA is to ease the national origin quota
per country requirement, the total employment-based green cards issued must still be
within the overall 140,000 worldwide limits. EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra
note 7, at 2.
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permanent residence adjudication, especially for nationals from the top
six countries of origin.93 Table 4 shows H-1B visas holders from the top
six countries: India, Canada, the U.K., Mexico, China and Japan.
Table 4
H-1B Visas Issued & Top Six Countries of Origin

95

2007

96

2008
97
2009

India

Canada

UK

Mexico

China

Japan

157,613

26,209

25,507

18,165

16,628

14,435

Total H1B Visas
94
Issued
461,730

154,726
123,002

23,312
22,156

19,209
14,610

16,382
14,352

13,828
12,922

11,788
9,677

409,619
339,243

The implication of the above mix is that nationals who are
beneficiaries of EB-2 and EB-3 have to wait longer and longer for their
country’s priority date.98 Table 5 shows the priority dates for EB-2 and
EB-3 petitions from China, India and Mexico.

93. The effect on Mexicans and Canadians is not considered in this analysis, as no
analysis on those nationals would be complete without consideration of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA is beyond the scope of this Article.
94. 2009 YEARBOOK , supra note 72, at 65.
95. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2007
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
84-87
(2008),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2007/ois_2007_yearbook.pdf
[hereinafter 2007 YEARBOOK].
96. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
84-87
(2009),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf [hereinafter
2008 YEARBOOK].
97. 2009 YEARBOOK , supra note 72, at 84-87.
98. See LAWLER, supra note 34. Priority date is the date the Department of Labor
accepts the Labor Certification Application and the immigration process cannot be
completed without the priority being current. Id.
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Table 599
Category

Description

EB-2

Advanced
Degree
Skilled
Worker

EB-3
EB-3

Other
Workers

Priority
Date
Current

China

India

Philippines

May 8,
2006
January 1,
2002

Current

December
15, 2004

May 8,
2006
October
22, 2003

March 22,
2003

March 22,
2003

January 1,
2002

March 22,
2003

December
15, 2004

The net effect is that petitioners from India and China, for instance,
may have to wait for their EB-3 legal permanent residence as long as
twenty years, and for twelve years or more under EB-2.100 Individuals
from other countries may have to wait six to seven years under EB-3, and
three to five years under EB-2.101
Table 6 below shows the annual legal permanent residency
admissions issued for adjustment of status under EB-2 and EB-3 during
the last ten years.102 As can be seen from Table 6, the admissions in
respect to adjustment of status under EB-2 for the last ten years range
from 12,900 to 68,800 and for EB-3 the range is from 26,962 to
109,700.103 These wide ranges shows the difficulty in keeping track of
these figures and reconciling them with the annual cap—an indication of
the administrative complexity involved in managing the admission of
immigrants in accordance with the provisions of immigration laws.

99. Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of St., Bureau of Visa Bulletin for
September
2010,
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV
(Aug.
9,
2010),
http://travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5113.html. The bulletin summarizes the
availability numbers during September 2010. Id.
100. EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7, at 1.
101. See id. at 6.
102. 2009 YEARBOOK, supra note 72, at 18-19.
103. Id.
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Table 6104
EB-2 & EB-3—Legal Permanent Residence Admissions (20002004)
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
EB-2-New
1,857
6,533
5,323
2,437
1,400
Arrival
EB-2-AOS
18,398 36,017 38,993 12,969
31,134
Total
20,255 42,550 44,316 15,406
32,534
EB-3-New
12,578 20,566 23,448 19,453
20,094
Arrival
EB-3-AOS
37,011 65,281 64,554 26,962
65,875
Total
49,589 85,847 88,002 46,415
85,969
EB-2 & EB-3—Legal Permanent Residence Admissions
Continued (2005-2009)
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
EB-2-New 1,488
972
1,171
1,214
1,216
Arrival
EB-241,109
20,939 42,991
68,832
44,336
AOS
Total
42,597
21,911 44,162
70,046
45,552
EB-3-New 19,357
29,531 22,388
9,922
6,873
Arrival
EB-3109,713
60,390 62,642
38,981
33,525
AOS
Total
129,070
89,922 85,030
48,903
40,398
IV. The Effectiveness of the Dichotomy Objectives in Keeping the
Balance at the Four Levels
This Part considers the effectiveness of the dichotomous objectives
on four levels: global labor market, domestic industry’s need, U.S.
workers, and international workers.

104. Id. Any unused visas for a category can be used in other employment-based
preference categories, and unused visas in one fiscal year can be used in future fiscal
years—should demand exceed the cap in that fiscal year. Nwokocha, supra note 75, at
44.
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Global Labor Market
1. Importance of Immigration

Immigration increases productivity and gross domestic income
without reducing native employment rate in the long run.105 Findings
have further indicated that immigration has the effect of creating jobs. 106
A survey found that over 25 percent of the technology companies
founded in the U.S. from 1995 to 2005 were headed by legal permanent
residence or naturalized citizens who initially came to study or work in
the U.S.107 Those companies generated more than “$52 billion in revenue
and employed 450,000 workers” in 2005.108
2. The Competition: Point Based System vs. Preference System
Due to the recognition that immigrants have made significant
economic contribution to their new countries,109 there exist other
attractive immigration destinations, apart from the U.S., such as Canada,
Australia,110 and New Zealand.111 These four countries112 were the
traditional receiving countries. Since 2000, several European Union
member states, including Germany, the U.K., France, Ireland, and
Sweden, reformed their immigration laws to join the competition to
attract the best and brightest.113 While there is cross-immigration among

105. See GIOVANNI PERI, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS IN
RECESSION
AND
ECONOMIC
EXPANSION
4
(2010),
available
at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Peri-June2010.pdf.
106. See NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, H-1B VISAS AND JOB CREATION 1 (2008),
available at http://www.nfap.com/pdf/080311h1b.pdf [hereinafter VISAS AND JOB
CREATION].
107. Wadhwa, supra note 8.
108. Id.
109. See Shachar, supra note 1, at 152.
110. Id. at 151.
111. See id. at 179-84 (New Zealand’s innovative “talent visa” system eliminates
the traditional long bureaucratic process the immigrant faces in securing employment
authorization.).
112. Id. at 159.
113. See id. at 151.
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these countries, India and China still maintain their status as the “two
main sending countries.”114
The common thread that exists among nearly all of these
immigration destination countries is that their immigration laws focus on
a “selective admission procedure” that is based on points and which
aggressively markets towards and recruits the best and brightest.115 A
typical point-based system awards points or scores cumulatively on
several bases including: education, job experience, language proficiency,
age range, and arranged employment, in addition to other variations.116
Once a potential immigrant achieves the points stipulated by the relevant
agency, legal permanent residency is granted immediately upon arrival to
the host country—not only to the principal applicants but also to their
dependents.117 The flexibility of the point-based system hinges on the
bases for awarding points, which, along with their corresponding point
values, can be changed. Likewise, the least amount of points needed to
qualify for legal permanent residency may be adjusted to reflect the
needs of the labor market or the types of professionals the country
seeks.118
On the other hand the dichotomous tension that pervades the U.S.
preference system seems to impede the U.S. from competing on the same
footing as the countries that have adopted a point-based system.119 In the
U.S., the best and brightest have to wait years for their legal permanent
residency.120 It is troubling that, in 2006, 26 percent of the patent
applications filed in the U.S. were owned or co-owned by foreign
nationals, and more than 40 percent of international patents filed by the
U.S. government had foreign authorship.121 This explicitly means that
these foreign nationals are likely in the U.S. on temporary work permits,
such as H-1B visas,122 with no certainty that they will be able to stay

114. Id. at 168 n.73 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. See id. at 151-52, 171-96.
116. Id. at 171-72.
117. Id. at 174 n.91, 175.
118. Id. at 174.
119. See id. at 196-99 (the highly skilled potential immigrant finds receiving
countries that grant permanent residency immediately upon the immigrant’s entry more
attractive, whereas the U.S.’ system is laden with burdensome bureaucracy and long
waits, leading to insecurity for both the worker and his employer).
120. EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7, at 1.
121. Wadhwa, supra note 8.
122. Id.
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given the long wait required to become a legal permanent resident.123
These patent-owning foreign nationals, along with their patent
ownership, would likely be received with open arms and granted
immediate residency by any of the competing countries.
3. Changing Economic Landscape
There seems to be a shift in the identities of sending countries such
as India and China, due to their burgeoning economic power.124 As a
result, a number of their nationals repatriated from countries such as the
U.S. in recent years, and repatriation numbers are likely to increase.125 In
Asia, countries such as Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea have joined
the repatriation club, where policymakers have spent extensively to
welcome back their overseas nationals.126 This “reverse brain drain”127
may have been further exacerbated by the deepening global recession,128
because receiving countries are cutting back on immigration due to its
perceived adverse effect on their domestic employment.129
4. Future of Immigration on the Global Level
In the long run, however, when the world economy recovers,
receiving countries, including the U.S., will scramble to fill in the
lacunae engendered by the reverse brain drain trend. Further, the looming
threat of an aging world population, and its corollary—a declining and

123. See EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7, at 1.
124. See Wadhwa, supra note 8.
125. Id. Because of the small number of visas available to foreign students studying
in the U.S., there is less than a 50 percent chance such a student will secure permanent
residency. Id.
126. Shachar, supra note 1, at 159-60, 167.
127. Villiers, supra note 35, at 1882. This occurs where “[h]ighly skilled
professionals, . . . who entered [a wealthier] country legally to study or work, . . . return[]
to their countries of origin in unprecedented numbers and driv[e] research and
development there.” Id.
128. See PERI, supra note 105, at 13; see also Vivek Wadhwa, Is the U.S.
Experiencing its First Brain Drain?, NEW AM. MEDIA (Mar. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.soc.duke.edu/GlobalEngineering/pdfs/media/losingtheworlds/nam_usexperie
ncing.pdf.
129. See PERI, supra note 105, at 6-7 (analysis finds that immigration reduces
native employment, but only in the short-run, over four or five years).
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aging workforce,130 would undoubtedly lead to very aggressive
marketing for, and recruitment of, the best and brightest at the global
level. Given the relative lack of competitiveness of its preference system,
the U.S. will likely lag behind in recruiting the best and brightest if the
problems associated with its dichotomous objectives remain unresolved.
B.

Needs of the Domestic Industries
1. Sentiments of the U.S Domestic Industry

Microsoft’s Chairman Bill Gates and Google’s Vice President for
People Operation Laszlo Bock echo the sentiments of the information
technology industry that, in order to maintain its status as the worldwide
leader in technology, the U.S. technology industry needs highly skilled
and talented foreign students and professionals to meet the demand
created by the shortage of skilled native workers.131 Further, both leaders
maintain that, if the U.S. does not reform its immigration system to
attract and retain the best and brightest, it would lose out to its other
global competitors who have designed their immigration systems just for
such purposes.132
2. Response by the U.S Domestic Industries
As a consequence of the U.S. immigration system’s inability to
meet the requirements of domestic industries in respect to attracting and
retaining the best and brightest and meeting the demand for skilled labor,
domestic companies, especially those in the information technology and
pharmaceutical industries, have responded by relocating their

130. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., WORLD POPULATION
AGEING: 1950-2050, at 29, U.N. DOC. ST/ESA/SER.A/207, U.N. SALES NO. E.02.XIII.3
(2002),
available
athttp://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/worldageing19502050/
[Hereinafter
WORLD POPULATION AGEING]. By 2050, older persons, those over sixty years old, are
expected to constitute 21 percent of the world’s population, whereas in 2010 this group
made up only 10 percent. Id. at xxviii.
131. Malshe, supra note 3, at 374-75; see VISAS AND JOB CREATION, supra note
106, at 2-3 (referencing the testimony of Laszlo Bock before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International
Law, on June 6, 2007).
132. Malshe, supra note 3, at 375.
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organizations to countries with friendlier immigration policies,133 or to
traditional sending countries, such as India and China.134
In 2007, Microsoft established the Microsoft Canada Development
Center, in Vancouver, British Columbia, to enable it to “recruit and
retain highly skilled people affected by the immigration issues in the
[U.S.].”135 In addition, U.S. companies, such as Cisco Systems and IBM,
have gone further by locating their global base in Bangalore, India. 136
Meanwhile, 34 percent of the research and development staff at General
Electric’s Jack Welch Technology Center in Bangalore are returnees
from the U.S., as are more than 50 percent of those with Ph.D.’s at the
IBM research center in the same city.137 Further, Indian companies are
discovering new drugs and designing components for jetliners for their
U.S. and European clients who have outsourced their projects.138 In
China, hundreds of billions of dollars are being invested jointly by
multinational companies and the Chinese government to make it an
“export power in semiconductors, passenger cars, and specialty
chemicals.”139 Further, the Chinese government is subsidizing research
laboratories in biochemistry, nanotechnology, computing, and aerospace,
where dozens of their top scientist are returnees from the U.S.140
Because protectionist measures have eroded the competitive edge of
the U.S. immigration system, these companies have further fueled the
reverse brain drain. Ironically, the very tool employed to protect the U.S.
workers against job loss or displacement is acting as a backlash; the job
creation and investment opportunities are lost in light of such relocation
and outsourcing.
C.

U.S. Workers
Trade unions and other workers interest groups have pushed for

133. Cromwell, supra note 3, at 473.
134. Wadhwa, supra note 8.
135. Cromwell, supra note 3, at 476 (alteration in original) (quoting Todd Bishop,
Microsoft Plans to Open Software Center in B.C., SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 6,
2007, at 1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Wadhwa, supra note 8.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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protectionist measures at every recent attempt to infuse competitiveness
into U.S. immigration law.141 The mechanisms utilized to safeguard the
interests of the U.S. workers essentially hinge on annual numerical
limitations on the issuance of H-1B, EB-2 and EB-3 visas, and the
requirement that employers test the labor market conditions.142
The labor market test requirements seek to prevent wage
suppression, adversely affected working conditions, and the
displacement of qualified U.S. workers.143 Those requirements are
achieved by paying the H-1B hire the prevailing wage or actual wage,
whichever is higher, as well as ensuring that the benefits offered are the
same as those offered to a U.S. worker.144 For EB-2 and EB-3 petitions,
the employer, in addition, has to advertise the job and carry out a
recruitment process to ensure there is no U.S. worker qualified to
perform that job; otherwise the qualified and willing U.S. worker should
be hired instead.145
The critical issues in this analysis are whether these protectionist
measures adequately protect the U.S. workers, and whether the price paid
for such measures is justified.
1. Labor shortage
One of the rationales for hiring H-1B workers is to meet the labor
shortage.146 In response to the information technology industry’s preACWIA lobbying effort, in support of which the industry maintained the
necessity of an increase in the H-1B program’s annual cap to meet labor
demand, critics noted that, despite high numbers of job vacancies in that
field,147 thousands of employees were laid off.148 The underlying reason

141. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 465; see also Christopher Fulmer, Comment, A
Critical Look at H-1B Visa Program and Its Effects on U.S. and Foreign Workers—A
Controversial Program Unhinged from Its Original Intent, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
823, 828-29, 843-49 (2009).
142. Cromwell, supra note 3, at 459-60.
143. Id. at 471.
144. Fulmer, supra note 141, at 830-31.
145. Malshe, supra note 3, at 366.
146. Cromwell, supra note 3, at 465-66.
147. Trucios-Haynes, supra note 40, at 1006.
148. Id. at 1013. In 1999, for instance Electronic Data Systems laid off 5,180
workers, Compaq laid off 2,150 workers, id. at 1013 n.194, and the average
unemployment rate for IT workers over forty years is more than five times that of other
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given for the layoffs, however, was that those workers lacked the
necessary skill to contribute to the growth of the industry.149 Further, it
was unreasonable to require employers to train under-qualified workers,
when there are qualified foreign workers available to perform the job
immediately,150 despite the extra administrative and financial burdens
imposed on these employers.151 Policymakers seemed to accept this
viewpoint and, to counteract against long-term labor shortage, they have
imposed higher petitioning fees, which go towards the establishing
scholarships and training funds for information technology students and
workers.152
2. Are They Really the Best and Brightest? Or Is It a Question of
Cheap Labor?
The other rationale for hiring and retaining the best and brightest
foreign workers is that they would contribute significantly to the
country’s human capital and knowledge base.153
Nevertheless, critics claim that 56 percent of the H-1B workers
were rated at Level I—“beginning level employees who have only a
basic understanding of the occupation [and who] perform routine tasks
that require limited, if any, exercise of judgment,”154 31 percent were
rated at Level II—”qualified employees who have attained, either
through education or experience, a good understanding of the

unemployed workers. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ACT, S. REP. NO. 106-260, at 28 (2000). According to a report
released by the National Research Council in 2000, older workers do face obstacles in the
IT industry even in boom time. Cromwell, supra note 3, at 468.
149. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 466.
150. Id. at 466.
151. See id. at 459 (extra administrative and financial burdens include the LCA and
the petitioning fees).
152. See id. at 461, 464, 469.
153. See id. at 473.
154. Norman Matloff, Fixing Our Badly Broken H-1B Visa and EmployerSponsored Green Card Programs 7 (Sept. 19, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (alteration
in original) (quoting EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PREVAILING
WAGE
DETERMINATION
POLICY
GUIDANCE
7
(2005),
available
at
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/Policy_Nonag_Progs.pdf) (internal quotation
marks
omitted),
available
at
http://www.cwalocal4250.org/outsourcing/binarydata/PrevWage.pdf; see also Fulmer,
supra note 141, at 851.
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occupation,”155 only 8 percent were classified at Level III—”experienced
employees who have with sound understanding . . . and have attained . . .
special skills or knowledge,”156 and just 5 percent were classified at
Level IV.157 Critics argue that IMMACT90 requires “highly specialized
knowledge” as the standard for qualifying for H-1B visas, yet only 13
percent of the H-1B hires actually qualified under that standard.158
Consequently, these critics conclude that either the majority of the H-1B
hires are “ordinary people doing ordinary work,” or the employers underrepresented the qualifications of these hires in order to pay a lower
prevailing wage.159
Although it is unlikely that employers misrepresent their H-1B
employees’ qualifications,160 it is likely that they hire foreign workers
who are overqualified relative to the job description.161 Since, according
to the Department of Labor guidelines, the prevailing wage is tied to the
qualifications and experience attributable to the job descriptions and not
to the worker’s actual qualification and experience, it would seem that,
although the employer is in compliance with the prevailing wage
requirement, it may hire a foreign worker at a wage rate that is not
commensurate with the worker’s actual, higher qualifications and
experience—hence, the cheap labor argument.162
The H-1B (or EB-2/EB-3 beneficiary) hire performing in
accordance with the job description renders moot the cheap labor
argument, and therefore no potential for wage suppression exists.
However, in this situation, the issue concerns hiring overqualified
workers, which is not disallowed by the current labor condition
application.163 Upon further examination, overqualified workers are

155. Fulmer, supra note 141, at 851-52 (quoting EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., supra
note 153) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. (quoting EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., supra note 154) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
157. JOHN MIANO, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, LOW SALARIES FOR LOW
SKILLS: WAGES AND SKILL LEVELS FOR H-1B COMPUTER WORKERS 7 (2007), available at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2007/back407.pdf; id. at 852; Matloff, supra note 154.
158. Fulmer, supra note 141, at 852 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) (2008)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
159. Matloff, supra note 154.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 851.
162. See id.
163. There are no findings, empirical or anecdotal, to indicate H-1B workers, or
beneficiaries of EB-2 or EB-3 have been hired to work in jobs other than what they have
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likely to perform at a higher level, and hence, enhance productivity. This
added value is not factored into the wages, thus benefitting the employer.
Viewed from this perspective, employers get more out of foreign
workers than they are willing to pay. Thus, the added value the employer
acquires more than offsets the additional administrative and financial
burdens associated with hiring a foreign national. This practice would
likely have some adverse effect, in the long run, on the wages paid for
such jobs, since the scope of the position would have been enlarged but
the wage would remain unchanged.
From the perspective of a U.S. worker with the minimum
qualifications required by the job, she would be competing with an
overqualified foreign national who thus would likely be the better
candidate. The labor condition application process for H-1B petition only
ensures against wage suppression and adverse working conditions.164
Displacement becomes an issue only during the labor certification
process for EB-2/EB-3 petitions, which requires that the employer
advertise the position and attempt to hire a willing and able U.S.
worker.165 Even then, it seems that employers tend to favor their
international workers who have already proven their abilities by making
significant contributions at less cost.166
3. The Economic Crisis
Prompted by massive job losses, particularly in the financial
industry, due to the recent economic crisis, the Grassley-Sanders
Amendment, a protectionist measure, bars (except under certain
circumstances) H-1B hires by banks and other financial institutions that
received a stimulus package under the TARP, until February 17, 2011.167
Despite criticism that the amendment would hinder the economic

been hired to perform as per their job description. See generally Wadhwa, supra note 8.
164. Only a thirty days’ notice must be posted in the job board of the employer
informing that an H-1B candidate is being hired for the job in question. Fulmer, supra
note 141, at 831.
165. See Malshe, supra note 3, at 366.
166. See id. at 386; see also Wadhwa, supra note 8 (“. . . I know from my
experience as a tech CEO that H-1Bs are cheaper than domestic hires. Technically, these
workers are supposed to be paid a ‘prevailing wage’ but this mechanism is riddled with
loopholes . . . so you can hire a superstar for the costs of an average worker.”).
167. KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 28, 748; see also Malshe, supra note 3, at 379-80.
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revival,168 the timeliness and the restraint, shown in terms of short term
restriction, reflect the recognition that, in the short run, economic
downturns do have an impact on employment,169 and the U.S. workers do
need to be protected, even if the number of H-1B hires in the industry as
compared to the overall U.S. workforce is negligible.170
4. Adequate Protection at a Justified Price?
Conceptually, the tools employed by the labor condition application
requirement for both the H-1B hires and beneficiaries of EB-2/EB-3
should adequately protect the U.S. workers against wage suppressions,
adverse working conditions, and displacements, and such protectionist
measures are needed. There is room, however, for manipulations and
circumventions, such as hiring overqualified international workers at the
expense of U.S. workers.
The protectionist measure taken in terms of quantitative restriction
is very controversial.171 The tension between the dichotomous objectives
becomes apparent. On one hand, there is a concern that increase or
removal of the numerical restriction would increase the influx of foreign
workers, who would then displace the U.S. workers from their jobs.172
On the other hand, the domestic industry, particularly the information
technology industry, needs the numerical limitations to be increased in
order to meet its demands for workers with particular skills sets who
happen to be foreign nationals.173 Those demands were met during the
period from 1999 to 2003, when the H-1B cap was increased—a
temporary measure.174 After 2003, the cap reverted to the pre-1999 level,
and no change was ever made to the quota restrictions relating to the
employment-based preference categories since IMMACT90’s inception

168. Malshe, supra note 3, at 380 (citing Economic Focus: Give Me Your Scientists,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 2004, at 84).
169. See PERI, supra note 105, at 4.
170. NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, H-1B VISAS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(2009), available at http://www.nfap.com/pdf/090205policybrief.pdf [hereinafter VISAS
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS].
171. See Trucios-Haynes, supra note 40, at 1008-10; Hahm, supra note 23, at 16971700.
172. Cromwell, supra note 3, at 457.
173. Hahm, supra note 23, at 1693.
174. Id. at 1675-76.
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in 1990.175 As a result, employers have started to relocate or outsource,
thus depriving the U.S economy of potential job creation and income
opportunities.176
At this point in time, it appears that the price paid for protectionism
is not justified. On one hand, the U.S workers are not adequately
protected and, on the other hand, they lose out in terms of loss of job
creation opportunity, when this very protectionist measures forces the
employers to relocate or outsource.
D.

International Workers
1. Protection for the International Workers

While the primary purpose of the LCA is to safeguard the U.S
workers against wage suppression and adverse working conditions, a
corollary purpose of that requirement is to ensure that the international
worker on an H-1B visa is also protected from wage exploitation and
“the imposition of inadequate working conditions.”177 The ACWIA
further requires H-1B workers to be eligible for the same benefits offered
to a U.S. worker employed in a similar position.178 The rationale for this
level of protection is that, by leveling the field between the U.S. worker
and international worker, an employer would now be required to offer
similar compensation package and working conditions to the
international workers. At the same time this also alleviates the incentive
to hire an international worker over an U.S. worker since the cost of
hiring an international would only be outweighed by the additional
administrative burden and costs of obtaining the work permit visas.179
Nevertheless, when employers manipulate or circumvent the system,
such as hiring overqualified international workers, the playing field gets
tilted against the U.S. workers. The additional value an overqualified
international worker would offer to the employer in terms of enhanced
productivity may outweigh the administrative cost of such a hire over a

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 6; Cromwell, supra note 3, at 456-57.
See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 477-78.
FRAGOMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 2:1.
Id.
Id.
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U.S. worker who may have the required qualification to do the job. 180
This has two adverse consequences: exploitation of wages for
international workers and, more importantly, potential for wage
suppression in the long run, thus eroding the protection afforded to the
U.S workers. Therefore, it follows, that any shortcomings in terms of
protection afforded to the international workers would also adversely
affect the U.S. workers.
2. Restrictions Imposed on the International Workers and Its
Consequences
On the other hand, the restrictions, particularly on quantitative
limitations and portability, imposed on H-1B employment have
significant repercussions. Since most of the H-1B hires do want to stay in
the U.S., they are likely to have an EB-2/EB-3 petition pending, and
because of the current backlog, most of them have to wait for a decade or
more for their legal permanent residency application to be adjudicated.181
During the pendency of the petition, with restricted portability, the
international worker’s career, personal development, and advancement
are impeded.182 Further, the uncertainty associated with final adjudication
of their legal permanent residency after the long wait has also prevented
these international workers from laying deep roots in this country.183
3. Anecdotal Findings
Anecdotal findings also suggest that, even before the recession,
international workers, even those who already have their legal permanent
residence, were returning to their home countries; this was so with
Indians and Chinese.184 The recession, of course, had exacerbated the

180. See KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 28, 748; see also Malshe, supra note 3, at 37980.
181. See EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7, at 1; Wadhwa, supra
note 8.
182. KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 1007-08; Fulmer, supra note 141, at 855.
Although allowed to change employers, employment must be within the same or similar
job classification. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j) (2009).
183. Wadhwa, supra note 8.
184. See VIVEK WADHWA ET AL., AMERICA’S LOSS IS THE WORLD’S GAIN (2009),
available at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedfiles/americas_loss.pdf.
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situation.185 The reason given for the reverse exodus seems to be pursuit
of professional advancement: 61 percent of Indians and 70 percent of
Chinese returnees considered there to be better prospects in their home
countries.186 Further, the findings revealed that 44 percent of the Indians
who returned to India held senior management positions, while only 10
percent of that same set of returnees had senior position in the U.S.187
The figures for the Chinese were 36 percent and 9 percent
respectively.188 Other motivating factors included wanting to be close to
friends and relatives.189 Surprisingly, visa difficulties were not one of the
dominant factors for returning.190
As for students who form the pool for H-1B recruitment, it appears
that only 58 percent of Indians, 54 percent of Chinese, and 40 percent of
Europeans wanted to stay for a few years to gain work experience before
heading home.191 Visa difficulties, however, were a dominant reason for
this sentiment.192 Meanwhile, 74 percent of Chinese and 86 percent of
Indians believed that they would thrive better in their home countries
because of optimism about the economy in that country.193
4. Aftermath of the Recession
While those findings may be reflective of the recessionary times,
and may even be welcoming given the high rate of unemployment, what
will the scenario be once the world gets out of its economic slump? If the
focal pursuits of these international workers, as suggested by the above
findings, are advancement of career and being close to their family and
friends, it is likely that any destination country offering benefits that
encapsulate those desires will be able to attract and retain the next set of
talent.

185. See id; see also Wadhwa, supra note 128; Villiers, supra note 35, at 1890.
186. Wadhwa, supra note 128.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. Id.; see also WADHWA, ET AL., LOSING THE WORLD’S BEST AND BRIGHTEST 1-3,
available
at
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/ResearchAndPolicy/Losing_the_World's_Best_a
nd_Brightest.pdf.
192. See Wadhwa, supra note 128.
193. Id.
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The Final Analysis: The Impact of the Dichotomy—A Case for
Reform? If So, What Reform?

Ideal System

Ideally, when the dichotomous objectives are in balance, U.S
workers should be adequately protected against displacement, wage
suppression, and adverse working conditions. Domestic industries should
also have access to international workers, in order to overcome labor
shortage, to be able to harness the special talents or abilities of
international workers in tandem with its U.S. workers, and to develop
business. The U.S., as a global competitor, should be able to attract the
talent needed to support its domestic industries’ needs, and international
workers should be able to identify the U.S. as the country that will meet
their career and personal advancement goals.
B. Current Status-Consequences of the Shortcomings of the System
Currently, the system is out of sync at all the four levels discussed
above. The decade or more wait for legal permanent residence is
impeding the U.S. from attracting the best and brightest talents. At the
same time, the U.S.’s global competitors are in the position to offer
immediate permanent residency.194 The burgeoning new economies, such
as in India and China, may impact the flow of immigrants. Already there
is evidence of reverse brain drain from the U.S. to these countries,
although that flow at present may have been exacerbated by the
deepening worldwide recession. Further compounding these changes is
the looming threat of the world’s aging population.195 All these
developments may heighten the competition for the best and brightest.
On the domestic level, dissatisfaction with the competitiveness of
the immigration system, which has resulted in employer’s inability to
hire the necessary skilled workers, has caused some of the leading
information technology companies to relocate or outsource their work. 196

194. See id.
195. See, e.g., WORLD POPULATION AGEING, supra note 130.
196. VISAS AND JOB CREATION, supra note 106, at 2; Malshe, supra note 3, at 376;
Cromwell, supra note 3, at 475-77.
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This, in turn, has serious repercussion to the U.S. economy; much needed
job creation opportunities are lost at the time when they are most
needed.197
The very mechanism utilized to protect the U.S workers against
wage suppression and adverse working conditions may have the potential
to be misused and may adversely affect the interest of the U.S. worker.
The hiring of overqualified international workers may be in compliance
with the law, but it still does have the potential to suppress wages in the
long run.198
Any immigration destination countries or home countries that can
offer career and personal advancement to international workers, as well
as an opportunity to be with their family, will likely be attractive.199
C.

What Kind of Corrective Measures

Given the imbalance, it is apparent that corrective measures are
needed. Various reforms have been suggested by commentators200 and
this Article focuses on taking corrective measures within the immigration
system to bring about the balance of the dichotomous objectives.
Whether these corrective measures would succeed would depend on how
well these measures will be able to synchronize the various needs at the
four levels: global competition, domestic industry, U.S. workers, and
international workers.
D.

Realignment: An Elegant Solution?

The realignment corrective measures should focus on two levels:
tightening the protectionist measures by leveling the playing field
between the U.S. workers and international workers, and improving
competitiveness by adjusting or modifying the quantitative limitations.

197. See VISAS AND JOB CREATION, supra note 106, at 12.
198. Wadhwa, supra note 8; see Trucios-Haynes, supra note 40, at 977, 986-88;
Fulmer, supra note 141, at 858. But see VISAS BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 76, at 13-14;
Malshe, supra note 3, at 369-70.
199. Shachar, supra note 1, at 158-59; Wadhwa, supra note 128.
200. See, e.g., Malshe, supra note 3, at 381-90; Shachar, supra note 1; Cromwell,
supra note 3, at 478-80; Hahm, supra note 23, at 1691-700.
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1. Leveling the Playing Field
The current practice of hiring overqualified international workers is
made possible because of the requirement that the prevailing wage be
tied to the job description.201 The net result of such practice favors the
hiring of an international worker over a U.S. worker, despite the
additional administrative and financial burdens associated with such a
hire, because of the extra value added an international worker contributes
to the employer.202
Requiring that the prevailing wages be tied to the qualification of
the international worker instead of the job description seems to be an
untenable solution, as this would mean that an overqualified person can
never take a low paying job.203
One proposal, which may be viewed as a compromise solution to
this issue, has been made in the H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2009
(S. 887) proposed by Senators Durbin, Grassley, and Sanders.204 The
proposal requires employers to pay the highest of the prevailing wage,
the median average wage, or the “median wage for skill level 2 . . . found
in the recent Occupational Employment Statistics [OES] survey.”205 By
requiring OES level 2 wages, this proposal prevents employers from
hiring overqualified international workers at level 1 and paying wages at
that level.206 However, there has been suggestion by critics that requiring
median average wage or median OES wage for level 2 constitutes
“disguised restriction on trade” and hence could be in violation of the
U.S.’s commitment to the General Agreement on Trade and Services
(GATS).207 It is further claimed that since the thrust of the proposal in S.

201. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) (2010); MIANO, supra note 157, at 2-3; Cromwell,
supra note 3, at 458-59.
202. Wadhwa, supra note 8; Matloff, supra note 154, at 9-10.
203. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 458.
204. H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2009, S. 887, 111th Cong. § 101(a) (2009).
205. Id. § 205(a).
206. See Matloff, supra note 154, at 23. More than 50 percent of the H-1B workers
are hired for jobs as classified as level one. Id. at 7.
207. JOCHUM SHORE & TROSSEVIN, PC, NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, LEGAL
ANALYSIS: PROPOSED CHANGES TO SKILLED WORKER VISA LAWS LIKELY TO VIOLATE
MAJOR
U.S.
TRADE
COMMITMENTS
14-15
(2010),
available
at
http://www.nfap.com/pdf/GATSLegalAnalysis_NFAPPolicyStudy_June2010.pdf
(quoting General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 14, Apr. 15, 1994 Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1177
(1994) [hereinafter GATS]).
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887 is to restrict H1-B hires—essentially a restriction on trade—the
GATS exception in Art. 14(c) that allows for restrictions “necessary to
secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent
with the provisions of the Agreement including those relating to: (i) the
prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices,” would not be
applicable.208 However, hiring overqualified international workers is
itself a restriction on trade, and, furthermore, it has an adverse effect on
wages in the long run. Accordingly, because the proposal under S. 887
curbs such practices, it should come within the GATS exception.209
The S. 887 proposal would have some leveling effect on the playing
field between the U.S. worker and international worker: the U.S. worker
is protected from displacement and the international worker gets paid
wages commensurate with his qualification. Leveling the playing field is
critical because once U.S. workers and international workers are on par
with regard to employment and wages, market force can freely determine
the type of skill sets and the number of international workers required by
the domestic market, as there is no longer a question of displacement
because of cheap labor.
2. Quantitative Limitations & Competitiveness
Numerous suggestions have been made regarding the
oversubscription issue with H-1B visas and the corresponding backlog
issue with EB-2/EB-3 petitions. Suggestions range from complete
removal of the cap210 to complicated staggered categorized exemptions
or increased caps.211
The complete removal of a cap seems an elegant solution.212 By
ensuring a level playing field, an employer would only hire an

208. Id. at 15 (quoting GATS art. 14). The argument is that the restrictive measure
itself must be in compliance with the preamble in Article 14, which requires any measure
“not to be applied in a manner that would constitute [a] . . . disguised restriction on trade
in services,” for the Article 14(c) exception of GATS to be applicable. Id. at 14-15.
209. See id.
210. Seth R. Leech & Emma Greenwood, Keeping America Competitive: A
Proposal To Eliminate The Employment-Based Immigrant Visa Quota, 3 ALB. GOV’T L.
REV. 322 (2010).
211. See Malshe, supra note 3, at 388-89; see also Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006); Mitchell Wexler, Policy Goal of
Immigration Reform—Our Nation’s Best Interest, 13 NEXUS 45, 46 (2008).
212. See Leech & Greenwood, supra note 210, at 356-57.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/4

36

SAMINATHAN_Formatted_Finalv8

2012]

4/11/2012 7:34 PM

COMPETITIVENESS VERSUS PROTECTIONISM

185

international worker if there were truly a shortage of labor with the
necessary talent or skill sets, which would enhance the employer’s
business and which is in line with the rationale of the immigration
policies.213 Market forces would determine the rest, including how many
H-1Bs are to be hired.214 Employers would get to decide how many of
these international workers are to be sponsored for immediate legal
permanent residency at any point in their employment (because they
would have become valuable human capital to the organization and
ultimately to the country).215 U.S. economic conditions would induce the
corrective adjustments that determine whether these legal permanent
residents stay or leave.This solution further meets the needs of the four
levels: global competitiveness, domestic competitiveness, protection of
U.S. workers, and protection of international workers.
However, whether this solution is palatable to politicians is another
issue to be considered. For example, Senator Simpson stated: “Since the
United States cannot accept all those who would wish to come, the
following very real questions then come to us: How many immigrants
should be admitted?”216 This statement, which was made during the
hearing before the subcommittee in 1981, seems to reflect the sentiment
of many politicians today. As a compromise, the Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (S. 2611), sponsored by Senators Arlen
Specter and others, proposes an increase in the H-1B cap to 115,000 with
a built in market-based calculation under which the cap is to be increased
by a further 20 percent if the cap was reached in the previous fiscal
year.217 Other proposals to overcome the oversubscription issue include
excluding internationals with advance degrees in science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics from that limitation.218 In respect to
backlog issues, S. 2611 recommends that the annual worldwide cap for
employment-based immigrants be increased to 450,000 for a period of
ten years, and subsequently level off at 290,000, with spouse and
children beneficiaries exempted from that cap.219 The annual per country

213. See id. at 355.
214. Id. at 324.
215. See id. at 355.
216. The Preference System, supra note 31, at 19.
217. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong.
(2006); Wexler, supra note 211, at 50-51.
218. See, e.g., S. 2611. § 501; Wexler, supra note 211.
219. S. 2611 § 501. Section 501 provides that spouses and children are to have their
own limitation of 650,000 for the ten years. Id. Presumably they are to be included in the
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limitation is to be increased to 10 percent.220 S. 2611 also further exempts
completely from the cap: “Aliens who have earned advanced degrees in
science, technology, engineering, or math and have been working in a
related field in the U.S. under a nonimmigrant visa in the [three] year
period preceding their application for an immigrant visa[,]”221 aliens
“who have received a national interest waiver[,]”222 and “spouse[s] and
minor children of . . . an employment-based immigrant.”223
These recommendations certainly go towards resolving the issues
resulting from the quantitative limitations imposed by the current
immigration laws and make the immigration system more competitive.
However, the question remains, is it competitive enough compared with
the U.S’s competitors? Although the recommendations liberalize the
quantitative limitations but what is interesting is the recommendation to
exempt certain qualifications from such restrictions. This is the right
direction.
VI. Conclusion
What reformative actions the U.S. government will take to remedy
the shortcomings of the immigration system in respect to the admission
of the best and brightest remains to be seen. What is certain is that some
form of remedial or corrective measures need to be taken soon with
regards to the current quantitative restrictions that have caused the
system to be uncompetitive. The corrective measures recommended in
this Article—leveling the playing field between U.S. workers and
international workers as well as liberalizing the quantitative restraints—
would go a long way towards resolving the current shortcomings of the
U.S. immigration system. The ongoing recession may have brought
about some complacency, given that the other destination and
repatriating countries have slowed down their race to attract the best and
brightest. Such complacency may not last long. Once the world shakes
itself out of the current economic slowdown, and with the looming threat

290,000 cap after the ten years. The rationale is to resolve the backlog issue within the
next ten years. Id.
220. S. 2611 § 502. Presumably the national origin restriction is retained to
maintain diversity. Id.
221. S. 2611 § 508(a)(1).
222. Id.
223. Id.
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of the world aging population, the race for the best and brightest will
intensify again. Given that immigrants’ contribute to fueling the
economy by creating jobs, both the domestic industry and U.S. workers
will benefit from such contributions. Thus, the U.S. needs to position
itself as the leader once more in attracting and retaining the best and
brightest, by taking those corrective measures before the recession is
over.
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